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CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN MARITIME
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Charles E. Lugenbuhl*
The law of products liability, in its relatively brief existence, has
undergone a number of transitions before emerging as the form of strict
liability which prevails today. Originally arising from a contractual theory
of implied warranty, the action for injuries sustained through a defective
product has gradually been transformed into an essentially pure tort
action.
In response to the evolution of products liability doctrine on land,
maritime courts struggled to incorporate different forms of the doctrine
into the body of maritime law. The creation of tort remedies distinct
from those available under common law resulted in several substantive
and jurisdictional problems in the course of shaping a maritime products
liability remedy. This paper will briefly trace the history of maritime
products liability, examine the present state of the doctrine, and discuss
aspects of the law which are still in transition.
THE ORIGINS OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The notion that a manufacturer could be liable for injuries caused
by his defective product to anyone other than the party to whom he
sold the product was not recognized until 1916 in MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co.' Previously, courts had followed the rule that in order for
a party to recover for injuries caused by a defective or negligently
designed product, privity of contract was required. 2 The remedy created
in MacPherson was an action based on the breach of the manufacturer's
duty to make a product carefully-if the manufacturer's negligence made
the product dangerous, the manufacturer was liable to subsequent users
of the product.3 By requiring proof of negligence to recover against a
manufacturer, MacPherson combined the contractual theory of implied
warranty with elements of tort law. This curious combination of contract
and tort law was destined to create much of the subsequent confusion
in products cases as courts were asked to consider which prescriptive
Copyright 1985, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Member Louisiana Bar Association.
1. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
2. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M & W 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
3. 217 N.Y. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
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period to apply and whether an implied warranty under a contract theory
extended as far as a duty under a negligence/tort theory.
Like the common law, maritime law had originally espoused a privity
of contract rule in actions on defective products.4 Similarly, maritime
courts eventually followed MacPherson and recognized that implied war-
ranties could extend beyond the immediate purchaser. The first step in
this direction came with the acknowledgement of implied warranties in
the maritime sale of goods. In Linen Thread Co. v. Shaw,5 the agents
of a fishing boat bought a seine from the plaintiffs, which turned out
to be defective. The plaintiffs brought suit for the purchase price, while
the vessel owner filed a claim alleging that the seine was defective. The
federal court upheld the vessel owner's claim, recognizing an implied
warranty of fitness under the common law and the law of Massachusetts. 6
The first case which extended MacPherson to the maritime setting
was Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co. 7 Interestingly, this case primarily
involved the extension of the warranty of seaworthiness to dockworkers,
granting them the benefits of one of the oldest types of strict liability
recognized in maritime law.' A longshoreman was injured when a newly
installed boom used to load cargo broke and fell on him. The court
found that, in addition to being owed a warranty of seaworthiness by
the vessel, the longshoreman was entitled to recover from the manu-
facturer, whom the court concluded was negligent in failing to test the
boom adequately before selling it. In applying the MacPherson implied
warranty-negligence standard, the court enunciated guidelines for incor-
porating common law remedies into the maritime law: A state rule that
is so widely accepted as to be construed as part of the general law of
torts may be incorporated into admiralty, provided the rule is harmonious
with the rest of admiralty law.9
As the law of maritime products continued to develop, this theme
prevailed: where common law developments did not conflict, maritime
courts were inclined to apply them.
Gradually, the MacPherson doctrine was extended until a plaintiff
filing suit under implied warranty was no longer required to show privity
4. The Mary Stewart, 10 F. 137 (E.D. Va. 1881).
5. 9 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1925).
6. See also The Nimrod, 141 F. 215 (S.D. Ala. 1905), aff'd per curiam, 141 F. 834
(5th Cir. 1906); Moore v. The Charles Morgan, 17 F. Cas. 670 (S.D. Ohio 1878) (No.
9754).
7. 149 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1945), aff'd, 328 U.S. 85, 66 S. Ct. 872 (1946).
8. Presumably, in addition to the warranty of seaworthiness, the obligation to provide
maintenance and cure may be considered a form of strict or absolute liability, since a
vessel owner is absolutely bound to provide for a seaman injured in the service of the
ship.
9. 149 F.2d at 99-100.
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of contract or actual negligence on the part of the manufacturer. Instead,
courts began to find liability for breach of the implied warranty that
a product was reasonably suitable for its intended purpose.10 This type
of implied warranty-strict liability was first expressed in maritime law
in Middleton v. United Aircraft Corp." The District Court of New York
held that, given the imposition of liability on a manufacturer for neg-
ligence in Sieracki, "it is but one logical step forward to allow recovery
against a manufacturer on a breach of warranty theory by one not in
privity with him. ' 2 Eliminating the need for a showing of negligence,
the court cited the social policy that the burden of injuries caused by
defective products be placed on the manufacturer because of the man-
ufacturer's ability to absorb the risk through insurance and higher prices,
and the difficulty in many cases of proving negligence even where it
may exist. 3
The elimination of privity of contract in implied warranty cases
removed products liability from the realm of strict contractual action
and placed it rather uncomfortably in an area somewhere between con-
tractual and delictual liability. To resolve this uncertainty, courts began
to articulate a primarily tort law theory of liability-the strict products
liability action. The common law case most associated with the creation
of this doctrine, Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,4 held that where
a manufacturer places a product on the market, knowing that it will
be used without further inspection, the manufacturer is strictly liable if
the user is injured due to a defect in the product.
The rule of Greenman and other state court decisions adopting strict
products liability was codified in Section 402A of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts. Specifically, Section 402A reflects the jurisprudential
rejection of privity and manufacturer negligence and requires only that
the seller's product be unreasonably dangerous to the user and that the
product reach the user without substantial change from the condition
in which it was sold." The Restatement significantly streamlines the
action in products liability, discarding the contract element altogether
and providing prospective plaintiffs with a less rigorous burden of proof
than under a negligence theory.
In maritime law, the adoption of a strict products liability in tort
proceeded somewhat more slowly. In the post-Sieracki era, claims against
manufacturers could be brought under one of two theories-negligent
10. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
11. 204 F. Supp. 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
12. Id. at 859.
13. Id. (citing W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 506-07 (2d ed. 1955)).
14. 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
15. Restatement Second of Torts § 402A (1965).
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manufacturing, or an implied warranty of fitness. 6 In some respects,
these theories are not entirely separable-courts tended to apply one or
the other, or occasionally both, while citing the same authorities-
MacPherson and Sieracki."
For example, in The S.S. Samovar case," which involved a defective
cargo lashing ring and which was decided only a year after Sieracki,
the district court, citing section 395 of the Restatement of Torts, the
precursor to section 402A, found that the manufacturer of the ring had
breached its general duty of care 9 to build a product which would not
create an unreasonable risk of harm when used properly. And in Delta
Engineering Corp. v. Scott,20 the Fifth Circuit analyzed one defendant's
liability for a defective rope in terms of whether the manufacturer knew
or ought to have known of the defect"'-decidedly a negligence analysis.
Noel v. United Aircraft Corp. illustrates some of the confusion
resulting from attempts to treat implied warranty and negligent design
as utterly distinct theories. The trial court concluded that the theory of
implied warranty had never been recognized in admiralty, absent privity
of contract, and dismissed plaintiff's implied warranty demands for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.2 Plaintiff
thereupon proceeded solely on the basis of negligent design and recovered
from the manufacturer. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting rather cur-
iously that the rule of MacPherson (implied warranty) was applicable
to the defendant. 23 Apparently, the Court of Appeals recognized that
the doctrine of implied warranty had been subsumed into the body of
tort law and that both implied warranty and negligent design were
methods of stating the same cause of action.
16. Compare Watz v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 431 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970) with Sevits
v. McKiernan-Terry Corp., 264 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
17. See generally McCune, Maritime Products Liability, 18 Hastings L.J. 831 (1967);
Alvey, MacPherson Sprouts Fins: Development of Products Liability Theories in Admiralty,
28 Loy. L. Rev. 1071 (1982).
18. 72 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1947).
19. Id. at 584. Section 395 states:
A manufacturer who fails to exercise reasonable care in the manufacture of a
chattel which, unless carefully made, he should recognize as involving an un-
reasonable risk of causing substantial bodily harm to those who lawfully use it
for a purpose for which it is manufactured and to those whom the supplier
should expect to be in the vicinity of its probable use, is subject to liability
for bodily harm caused to them by its lawful use in a manner and for a purpose
for which it is manufactured.
Restatement of Torts § 395 (1934).
20. 322 F.2d II (5th Cir. 1963).
21. Id. at 19.
22. 204 F. Supp. 929, 941 (D. Del. 1962).
23. 342 F.2d 232, 236 (3d Cir. 1964).
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The theory of implied warranty, recognized in Middleton, continued
to be recognized by admiralty courts, despite the apparent rejection of
the theory in Noel. In Krause v. Sud Aviation Societe Nationale de
Constructions Aeronautiques,24 the Second Circuit held that the doctrine
of implied warranty was a part of admiralty law and was applicable to
a claim for wrongful death caused by the failure of a part in a helicopter
flying in the Gulf of Mexico. Explicit in Krause was a rejection of
Noel-according to the Second Circuit, the doctrine of implied warranty
had become so widely accepted as to be cognizable in admiralty. 25
Despite the similarity of the actions, the question of whether a
products liability claim was based on negligent design or implied warranty
was important, because of the different consequences which could flow
from one or the other designation. Since implied warranty originated
in contract (despite the removal of the privity requirement), arguably
certain features of contract law such as prescriptive periods and burdens
of proof were applicable. Another problem unique to maritime law was
the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Traditionally, a contract to build
a vessel has been treated as non-maritime. If implied warranty originated
from contract, not tort, did a claim for injuries to a vessel-caused breach
of an implied warranty express a maritime cause of action?2 6 The Fifth
Circuit answered the question in the negative in Jig The Third Corp.
v. Puritan Marine Insurance Underwriters Corp.27 The plaintiff, who
was the corporate owner of a shrimp boat which sank in the Gulf of
Mexico, brought suit against the shipbuilder under three theories of
recovery-breach of warranty, negligent design, and strict liability. The
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, finding that the boat had sunk
as a result of a defect in the design. The shipbuilder appealed, urging
that any liability on their part must be found in the contract itself. In
holding that an action in implied warranty is non-maritime, the Fifth
Circuit nevertheless upheld the verdict in favor of the plaintiff under
the theory of negligent design. The court found nothing in (the implied
warranty provision) which would preempt a cause of action in negligence.
The existence of two remedies for what was in essence one cause
of action was, as demonstrated in Jig III, superfluous and confusing.
Clearly, a single theory which would encompass the elements of both
warranty and negligent design was needed.
24. 301 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 413 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1969).
25. Id. at 523. See also Sanderlin v. Old Dominion Stevedoring Corp., 385 F.2d 79
(4th Cir. 1967), where the Fourth Circuit held that a stevedore owed a warranty to a
shipowner, and stated that it was guided by the recent trend in products liability cases.
26. For a discussion of jurisdiction, see infra text accompanying notes 57-70.
27. 519 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1976).
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SECTION 402A IN MARITIME LAW
The earliest cases in which Section 402A liability surfaced in maritime
law were cases involving the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA).
In Soileau v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 2a the plaintiff's husband was killed
on a platform on the outer continental shelf when a crane toppled from
its base. The district court found the manufacturer liable, holding that
the beneficiaries could recover under DOHSA "provided the principles
expressed in sections 400 and 402A are not inconsistent with admiralty
law." ' 29 By 1972, enough lower courts had recognized one form or
another of strict products liability for the Eighth Circuit in Lindsay v.
McDonnell-Douglas Aircraft Corp.,30 to declare that strict liability in
tort, as expressed in Section 402, "should be embraced by federal
maritime law."'"
To succeed in an action based on Section 402A, a plaintiff must
show:
(1) that the defendant sold or manufactured the product,
(2) that the product was in a defective condition when it left
the defendant's control, and
(3) that the defect resulted in injury to the plaintiff.
In defining "defective condition," Section 402A adds the phrase
"unreasonably dangerous to the user.'' 3 2 To show that a product is
unreasonably dangerous, courts generally require that a plaintiff dem-
onstrate that the risks inherent in the product were greater than those
which a reasonable buyer would expect,33 and that the likelihood and
gravity of harm outweighed the benefit and utility of the product. 34 A
product may be unreasonably dangerous if it was defectively designed,3"
or if the manufacturer failed to include warnings on the product which
would have apprised the user of potential dangers.
The duty to warn includes those dangers that are known or rea-
sonably foreseeable at the time of marketing. 6 A duty to warn exists
28. 302 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. La. 1969).
29. Id. at 126. See also Schaeffer v. Michigan-Ohio Navigation Co., 416 F.2d 217
(6th Cir. 1969).
30. 460 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1972).
31. Id. at 637.
32. Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A(1) (1965).
33. Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1973).
34. Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980); Brown v. Link Belt
Division of FMC Corp., 666 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1982).
35. Byrd v. Hunt Tool Shipyards, Inc., 650 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1981).
36. Branch v. Chevron Int'l Oil Co. 681 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1982); LeBoeuf v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 623 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980); Foster v. Ford Motor Co.,
616 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1980).
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even where foreseeable misuse of the product may occur.3 7 However,
the duty to warn may sometimes be tempered by the knowledge or
expertise of the user. In Martinez v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 31 suit was
brought against a barge owner and the manufacturer of noxious chem-
icals for the wrongful death of the plaintiff's husband, who was killed
by noxious fumes inhaled while he was stripping a barge. The Court
of Appeals held that the adequacy of a warning must be measured by
the knowledge of the ordinary consumer who purchases it or is expected
to use it. In the case of the noxious chemical, the court concluded that
the barge stripping company had sufficient knowledge of the potential
danger posed by the product.
The distinction between the duty to warn of potential dangers from
an otherwise safe product and negligent design is illustrated in the recent
decision of Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc.3 9 Four men drowned
in the Gulf of Mexico when the motorboat from which they were fishing
filled with water and swamped. The water had entered the boat through
the bilge hole, filling the bilge and flooding the batteries in the boat's
stern which operated both the bilge pump and the radio. Because of
the boat's design, the bilge space was enclosed and flooding could not
be noticed immediately nor did the boat contain any type of self-bailing
system.
The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, finding that the men
lost their lives, not because the boat was defectively designed, but because
they failed to replace the bilge plug in time. The Fifth Circuit reversed,
concluding that, although the boat was not defectively designed, the
manufacturer should have foreseen that the bilge plug could come loose
at sea (allowing the bilge to fill unnoticed) and had a duty to warn
purchasers of this possibility. The court held that, to be adequate, a
warning must:
(1) be designed to reasonably catch the consumer's attention,
(2) be comprehensible and give a fair indication of the specific
risk involved,
(3) be of an intensity justified by the magnitude of the risk.40
In the case of the boat in Pavlides, no warnings were placed on the
boat. Further, the type of boat which swamped was superficially quite
37. Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 697 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir.), 716 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1983)
(en banc), reh'g denied, 744 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1984); Harville v. Anchor-Wate Co., 663
F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1981).
38. 529 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1976).
39. 727 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1984).
40. Id. at 338 (citing Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Black & Decker Mfg., 518 S.W. 2d
868 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974)).
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similar to another boat, known for its buoyancy, marketed by the same
manufacturer.
To summarize, in a maritime products liability action under Section
402A, a plaintiff may succeed if he can show injury from a product
which was unreasonably dangerous if, at the time it leaves the defendant's
control, it contains a design defect the inclusion of which renders the
risks in using the product greater than the expectations of the normal
user; or if otherwise safe, is rendered unsafe by the failure to include
adequate warnings of potential problems with the product's use.
DEFENSES TO PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIMS
Under Section 402A of the Restatement, two defenses have tradi-
tionally been available to defendants. Initially, the manufacturer could
contravene plaintiff's claim to relief by demonstrating that the product
was not unreasonably dangerous when it left the manufacturer 4 '-that
is, that the defect arose after leaving the manufacturer's control. Ad-
ditionally, the manufacturer could introduce evidence to show that the
product was not being subjected to normal use. Under the product
misuse theory, the manufacturer was required to show more than in-
attentiveness or simple carelessness. Generally he had to show that the
product was being used for a purpose for which it was not reasonably
intended. 42
The effect of limiting a manufacturer's defenses to a showing of a
non-defective product or product misuse was to place upon the man-
ufacturer a very high burden of proof in order to defeat the plaintiff's
claim. Likewise, when a manufacturer could demonstrate product misuse,
the plaintiff was absolutely barred from recovery, although the manu-
facturer may have been to some degree at fault.
With the advent of the doctrine of comparative negligence, many
states began to incorporate principles of comparative fault into state
strict liability and products liability actions. The reason most often
offered for applying comparative negligence was that no equitable result
could be achieved otherwise in instances where the manufacturer, other
negligent defendants, and the plaintiff were each in part responsible for
the injury to the plaintiff.4
41. Scott v. White Trucks, 699 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1983); Madden v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 334 So. 2d 249, 253, 255 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
42. Jones v. Menard, 559 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1977).
43. See, e.g., Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42
(Alaska 1976); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380 (1978); Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 654 P.2d 343 (Hawaii 1982).
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Although comparative negligence had existed in maritime law for a
considerable time, as a defense under the Jones Act and DOHSA,
admiralty courts were unwilling to limit the plaintiff's recovery in a
strict products liability case by applying comparative negligence until the
Ninth Circuit decision in Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Con-
structions and Design Co.44 In that case, the court cited the growth and
prevalence of comparative fault in the common law, as well as the
prevalence of comparative fault in maritime law as bases for extending
the doctrine to reduce recovery by a plaintiff in a products liability case
in proportion to the percentage of his fault.
Pan-Alaska stood alone among appellate court decisions, until the
1983 decision of Lewis v. Timco.45 Alfred Lewis, a crewmember aboard
an offshore drilling barge, was injured when the hydraulic tongs he was
using failed to shut off, causing a cable attached to the tongs to wrap
around his body. The trial court found that the tongs malfunctioned
because of a design defect and further found that Lewis was partially
negligent in failing to adjust the line properly. The trial court rendered
judgment in favor of Lewis, apportioning fifty percent of the fault to
the three defendants and fifty percent to Lewis.
The Court of Appeals initially reversed; however, on rehearing en
banc, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's application of com-
parative negligence. The court noted at the outset that comparative fault
had a long history as the risk allocating principle under the maritime
law. 46 The application of comparative fault in all other aspects of mar-
itime personal injury except products liability would, the court concluded,
lead to a number of inequitable consequences. As an example, the court
cited the Death on the High Seas Act, where a wrongful death claim
based on the defective product might be subject to comparative negligence
but an action by a plaintiff who was only injured would not. 47 In
addition, the court reviewed state court decisions which applied com-
parative fault, and concluded that strict liability differed from negligence
only insofar as the knowledge of the defect was imputed to the man-
ufacturer. Finally, the court undertook a cost analysis and determined
44. 565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1977).
45. 716 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1983).
46. Id. at 1427.
47. 46 U.S.C. § 766 (1983) states that, in determining the amount of an award under
DOHSA, a court must "take into consideration the degree of negligence attributable to
the decedent and reduce the recovery accordingly." 716 F.2d at 1428. The Fifth Circuit
construed this statement to require application of comparative negligence to all wrongful
death claims under DOHSA, whether based on negligence or products liability. Thus, if
comparative negligence were not applied to other products liability claims, the survivors
of a deceased worker could have their claims reduced according to fault while a surviving
injured worker's claim would not be subject to reduction.
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that (1) user behavior would be altered if recovery would be diminished
by the proportion of their fault, and (2) the manufacturer would have
the correct economic incentive to make a safer product, but would not
be unduly burdened. 48
The application of comparative fault to products liability in Lewis
was confined to comparative negligence. Recently, the Fifth Circuit has
expanded the ambit of comparative fault to include voluntary assumption
of the risk as well. In National Marine Service, Inc. v. Petroleum Service
Corp. ,49 a multi-purpose tank barge carrying a cargo of liquid sulfuric
acid sank when the liquid shifted towards the stern during unloading.
The accident was determined to be the result of faulty design, which
had left the center of buoyancy forward of the center of gravity of the
cargo. The vessel owner had experienced difficulties with other similar
barges from the same manufacturer-nevertheless, he failed to take
additional precautionary measures. The trial court concluded that the
owner had assumed the risk of the defect and barred the owner from
recovering against the manufacturer.
The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that no distinction should be
made between assumption of the risk and contributory negligence, so
that all of plaintiff's conduct would be analyzed in terms of comparative
fault. The court considered the maritime goal of uniformity and pre-
dictability in reaching this result, and observed that the theoretical
distinctions between contributory negligence and assumption of the risk
"are often lost in the practical application of these defenses. ' 'sU
The Lewis and National Marine Service decisions have erased many
of the distinctions between products liability actions and actions in strict
liability and negligence. Evidently, any future claim for damages, whether
it is grounded on negligence or products liability, will be dealt with by
maritime courts according to percentage of fault. The only practical
distinction between the theories of recovery will be the presumption of
knowledge imposed on manufacturers in products cases. The change is
significant because it represents a rejection of the prior theory of strict
liability, which would have relieved plaintiffs from their own carelessness
48. 716 F.2d at 1432. The notion that user behavior can be altered by diminishing
recovery to injured workers is questionable, if one regards injuries on the job as a non-
voluntary process. A cost/benefit analysis seems particularly inappropriate where the whole
purpose of a products liability theory was to place the burden of the injury upon the
party most able to absorb the loss. This is not to belie the argument that a plaintiff
should not have his recovery diminished for his part in causation, since all plaintiffs are
not equally innocent of fault. However, to describe comparative fault as a deterrent to
plaintiff negligence seems insensitive and irrelevant.
49. 736 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1984).
50. Id. at 276.
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and placed the entire burden of the loss upon the manufacturer. Likewise,
where assumption of the risk formerly may have acted as a total bar
to plaintiff, a plaintiff may now recover to the extent he was not at
fault."
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
This analysis thus far has dealt with the nature of the products
liability action. Another issue of contemporary interest concerns the
availability of punitive damages in maritime personal injury claims. In
1981, the Fifth Circuit held in Dyer v. Merry Shipping, Inc. 2 that
punitive damages may be awarded under the general maritime law. The
plaintiff in Dyer brought claims based on both Jones Act negligence
and unseaworthiness-however, the court expressly declined to decide
the issue of whether punitive damages were recoverable under the Jones
Act."
51. The practicing maritime lawyer in Louisiana must be conversant with both state
and federal tort law, given the interplay between maritime and non-maritime localities in
the offshore oil industry. In this regard, it is significant to note that the Fifth Circuit
recently certified to the Louisiana, Supreme Court the question of whether plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence could be advanced by defendant to defeat or mitigate a claim in
products liability, in the case of Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 717 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1983).
On original hearing, 709 F.2d 6 (5th Cir. 1983), the Court of Appeals found that
contributory negligence did not constitute victim fault for purposes of products liability,
but later certified the question in light of the recent trend in Louisiana law that contributory
negligence constitutes victim fault in strict liability cases not involving a defective product.
See Dorry v. Lafleur, 399 So. 2d 559 (La. 1981); Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d 1146
(La. 1983); Kent v. Gulf States Utilities, 418 So. 493 (La. 1982); Hyde v. Chevron Inc.,
697 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1983). The Louisiana Supreme Court, in response to the certified
question, determined that contributory negligence does not act as an absolute bar to
recovery in strict products liability cases, but that in certain instances the principles of
comparative fault contained in La. Civil Code art. 2323 may be applied by analogy to
reduce a plaintiff's award of damages. Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166 (La.
1985). According to the majority, comparative fault may be applied where plaintiff was
negligent and his reduction of recovery may serve as an incentive for careful product use,
but not under circumstances where the injury is caused by the defective product and
ordinary carelessness or contributory negligence of the employee. Unfortunately, the opinion
offers no guidance to trial judges or attorneys as to how the two types of circumstances
may be distinguished, but merely suggests that the application of comparative negligence
to products liability cases might be made on a case by case basis. Given the opaque
reasoning of the majority opinion and the presence of two concurring and two dissenting
opinions, the applicability of comparative negligence in Louisiana products liability law
to diminish a plaintiff's recovery remains uncertain.
52. 650 F.2d 622 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 659 F.2d 1079 (1981).
53. Id at 626. See also Note, Punitive Damages in Maritime Personal Injuries: Dyer
v. Merry Shipping Co., 43 La. L. Rev. 823 (1983).
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Quite recently, the Ninth Circuit addressed this issue in Kopczynski
v. The Jaqueline4 and concluded that the Jones Act does not permit
an award for punitive damages. The court noted that prior to the
enactment of the Jones Act, a number of cases established that only
compensatory damages were available under the Federal Employers Li-
ability Act and that, absent any legislative directive to the contrary, no
basis existed to award punitive damages under the Jones Act. 5
The distinction between actions for unseaworthiness and those under
the Jones Act, in determining whether plaintiff may recover punitive
damages, poses several interesting questions. If claims under the Jones
Act cannot include punitive damages, is such a limitation contained in
DOHSA as well? Arguably, a plaintiff claiming under a federal statute
will have to base his products liability claim on the general maritime
law if he is to recover punitive damages. This is not a significant problem,
since most pleadings incorporate several theories of recovery in one
claim.
More difficult is the question of whether a conflict now exists
between the circuits as to awarding punitive damages at all. The practical
distinction of awarding punitive damages in unseaworthiness cases but
precluding them in Jones Act cases will be negated where a seaman
recovers under both theories, as is often the case. The basis for awarding
or not awarding punitive damages for outrageous conduct of the vessel
owner would seem to be the same, regardless of whether the claim is
based on negligence or unseaworthiness. Further, the clear conflict in
approaches in two actions which are generally brought together frustrates
the desire for uniformity that pervades the law of admiralty . 6 For the
moment, however, at least in the Fifth Circuit, awards in products
liability actions brought under the general maritime law may potentially
include punitive damages.
JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS
Once it became clear that an action in products liability existed in
maritime law, courts were confronted with the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction. As the decision in Jig III pointed out, a claim in warranty
that arises from a contract to build a vessel is non-maritime and therefore
not cognizable in an admiralty court. Similarly, once claims in strict
products liability were acknowledged, the question arose as to which
products could be considered maritime. That is, how much of a con-
nection to maritime activity was a product required to have in order
54. 742 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1984).
55. Id. at 560.
56. Note, supra note 53, at 830.
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for the case to be heard by an admiralty court? A manufacturer of
copper coil incorporated into a window unit air conditioner normally
used in homes, for example, does not necessarily manufacture his product
with the expectation that it will be used on a crewboat. Likewise, the
company which manufactures a small microchip which can be used in
a number of different electronic devices does not necessarily contemplate
that the chip would undergo nautical use. On the other hand, a man-
ufacturer of heavy duty ropes might expect a large amount of his product
to be used in a maritime setting. The only guideline available to aid
courts in distinguishing maritime from non-maritime activity was the
United States Supreme Court's nebulous test in Executive Jet Aviation,
Inc. v. City of Cleveland. 7 Under Executive Jet, a tort is maritime if
it occurs on or above navigable waters and the tort involves a significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity.
Rather than attempt to delineate between the myriad situations which
would inevitably arise if a case by case line drawing were undertaken,
the Fifth Circuit held in Sperry Rand Corp. v. Radio Corporation of
America8 that the Executive Jet test is satisfied when the infliction of
damages to a vessel occurs on navigable water, even though the product
itself may not have been manufactured exclusively for maritime use and
is not automatically associated with traditional maritime activity. In the
Sperry decision, the product involved was a small piece of electronic
equipment installed in the vessel's gyroscope, and used in "virtually
every conceivable aspect of electronic equipment." 5 9 The court, recog-
nizing the need for uniformity in maritime products liability law, and
the difficulty involved in attempting to distinguish between traditionally
maritime and non-maritime products, determined instead that if a prod-
uct on board causes damage to a vessel in navigation, the relationship
to maritime activity has been established.
Other circuits have split on the issue of whether some nexus between
the product and traditional maritime activity is required. The First Circuit
in Austin v. Unarco Industries, Inc. 60 agreed with the Sperry Rand
holding that no reason existed to distinguish between manufacturer's
according to whether they designed or intended their products for mar-
itime use-however, the court found that admiralty jurisdiction should
not extend to workers installing asbestos on a vessel in drydock because
57. 409 U.S. 249, 93 S. Ct. 493 (1972). The Court held that in order for an action
for personal injury to be considered maritime, the accident must occur on or above
navigable water and, additionally, the tort must bear a significant relationship to traditional
maritime activity.
58. 618 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1980).
59. Id. at 321.
60. 705 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 34 (1983).
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the work had no relationship to traditional maritime activity. 6 The
Fourth Circuit in White v. Johns-Manville Corp.62 declined to embrace
the Sperry Rand decision, and limited its holding to a finding of ju-
risdiction where the product in question was marketed as maritime
asbestos. 63 In Keene Corp. v. United States,64 a suit by the manufacturer
of the product against a party it claimed was responsible for Keene's
exposure to claims for illness caused by asbestosis, the Second Circuit
declined to follow Sperry Rand and held that, without some connection
to traditional maritime activity, the plaintiff's cause of action was not
cognizable in admiralty. 65
In addition to the relationship of the product to maritime activity,
courts have had to determine how far inland to extend a maritime
products claim. The Austin decision focused on the nature of the work-
ers's job in determining jurisdiction over his claim in products liability.
The Ninth Circuit has distinguished between ship construction and ship
repair in determining whether the worker was engaged in maritime or
non-maritime work. 66 Likewise, the Fifth Circuit, when confronted with
the question of whether a shipyard employer possessed a maritime cause
of action against the manufacturer of asbestos for the compensation
paid to employees, held that a complaint's allegations did not establish
admiralty jurisdiction because the workers contracted the disease during
ship construction.61
Most recently, in Harville v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.,68 the
Eleventh Circuit has applied the four-part test for admiralty jurisdiction
set forth in Kelly v. Smith.69 In determining that the plaintiff's work
had no more than an attenuated relationship to admiralty, the court
looked to: (1) the function or role of the worker, (2) the type of vessel
61. Id. at 14.
62. 662 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1981).
63. Id. at 240.
64. 700 F.2d 836 (2nd Cir. 1983).
65. Id. at 844. The case notably did not involve a suit by a party injured by the
asbestosis in a maritime setting; instead, the suit was founded on land based contractual
agreements which ultimately resulted in liability to the plaintiff from maritime workers.
The court's decision to find no connection to maritime activity in this type of activity
does not necessarily mean that it would find no maritime jurisdiction in a Sperry Rand
situation. Nonetheless, the case does show a willingness on the part of the Second Circuit
to undertake a line drawing process.
66. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United States District Court, 698 F.2d 967 (9th Cir. 1983).
But see Francois v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 434 (N.D. Cal 1983) (where
district court made no distinction between ship construction and repair), aff'd, 749 F.2d
37 (9th Cir. 1984).
67. Lowe v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 723 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1984).
68. 731 F.2d 775 (11th Cir. 1984).
69. 485 F.2d 520, 525 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974).
[Vol. 45
MARITIME PERSONAL INJURY
or vehicle involved, (3) the causation and type of injury, and (4) the
traditional concept of the role of admiralty law. Applying this last
requirement, the court observed that the need for uniformity in admiralty
jurisdiction did not extend to the shore-based asbestos workers.
Although the issue seems to be foreclosed in the Fifth Circuit,70 the
question of subject matter jurisdiction over products manufactured with
no expectation of maritime use remains a problem if one reads Executive
Jet to require proof of a significant relationship to traditional maritime
activity. Clearly, the locality requirement may be satisfied when the
accident occurs in a maritime setting, although the product was man-
ufactured on shore. Nevertheless, the activity engaged in by the defendant
may often have no relation to maritime activity, and the presence of
the product on board a vessel may be purely fortuitous. The Fifth
Circuit noted that the defendants in Sperry Rand were unable to cite
one case "where the requirement of 'significant relationship to traditional
maritime activity', added by Executive Jet, was not satisfied by the
sinking of, or inflicting of damage upon, a marine vessel on navigable
waters."'" In fact, Executive Jet may be read simply to require that the
vessel on which the product fails be engaged in maritime activity-the
boat versus airplane distinction-and nothing more. This approach is
arguably sound when it is foreseeable to the manufacturer that the
product could be used for a maritime purpose-but what of products
which have no function necessary to the operation of the vessel-for
example, a personal item of a crewmember which malfunctions and
causes injury? The all-inclusive rule of Sperry Rand would seemingly
include these situations, though no relationship to maritime activity
exists. The inequities resulting from requiring non-maritime manufac-
turers to defend their products in admiralty court may eventually compel
refinement of the Sperry Rand holding.
CONCLUSION
The recent developments in the law of maritime products liability
demonstrate an increased willingness on the part of admiralty courts to
fashion a remedy more consistent with the principles of maritime law
rather than simply attempting to mirror common law decisions. The
application of comparative negligence to products liability cases and,
more particularly, the inclusion of assumption of the risk within the
term comparative fault show the court's determination that, wherever
possible, liability be apportioned according to fault. In this sense, mar-
70. Sohyde Drilling & Marine Co. v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 644 F.2d
1132 (5th Cir. 1981).
71. Sperry Rand, 618 F.2d at 321.
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itime products liability appears to have departed from the strict liability
principles of the Restatement. The treatment of voluntary assumption
of the risk as a form of comparative fault raises the question of when,
if ever, product misuse will act as a total bar to the plaintiff's recovery.
The availability of a strict liability action in tort has obviated the
jurisdictional difficulty previously encountered by plaintiffs suing under
a theory of implied warranty. Nevertheless, from the standpoint of the
non-maritime manufacturer, the question of subject matter jurisdiction
remains one of some concern. If the Sperry Rand holding is in fact
dispositive, the maritime products liability action will have had the effect
of extending admiralty jurisdiction-arguably, beyond the limits set forth
in Executive Jet. Thus, the Fifth Circuit's decision to fashion an all-
inclusive rule of subject matter jurisdiction seems ill-advised and warrants
reexamination.
The emergence of a strict products liability action in maritime law,
however attractive it may be to many plaintiffs, has not eliminated the
alternative actions in implied warranty or negligent design. Depending
upon his relationship to the manufacturer, a plaintiff may prefer to
proceed under one of these alternate theories. Nonetheless, a party is
no longer required to set forth an assortment of theories of recovery
in his complaint in order to bring a strict products liability action. In
this respect, maritime law has finally achieved a straightforward, fairly
consistent theory of products liability.
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